Topan Yulia Pratama (1), Vegitya Ramadhani Putri (2), Fakhry Amin (3), Ade Imam Muttaqien Halim (4)
General Background: Judicial review safeguards constitutional supremacy, protects fundamental rights, and maintains institutional accountability within constitutional democracies. Specific Background: Indonesia and the United States employ distinct constitutional review arrangements shaped by different legal traditions, institutional structures, and judicial doctrines. Knowledge Gap: Comparative understanding of how centralized and decentralized review models reconcile legal certainty, interpretive flexibility, and access to constitutional justice requires further normative examination. Aims: This study compares judicial review frameworks in both countries through normative legal research using statutory, conceptual, case-based, and comparative approaches. Constitutional provisions, legislation, judicial decisions, and legal scholarship were examined qualitatively. Results: Indonesia centralizes constitutional review of statutes within the Constitutional Court, emphasizing final, generally binding decisions and interpretive uniformity, while assigning review of subordinate regulations to the Supreme Court. Conversely, the United States distributes constitutional review authority across its judiciary, relying on concrete disputes, judicial precedent, and evolving constitutional interpretation. The comparison identifies contrasting strengths and limitations concerning legal consistency, institutional accessibility, and judicial adaptability. Novelty: This study integrates institutional authority, constitutional doctrine, and judicial interpretation into a comparative framework examining the tension between normative stability and contextual responsiveness. Implications: Strengthening constitutional adjudication requires improved judicial reasoning, institutional coordination, doctrinal development, and broader access to constitutional justice without compromising constitutional supremacy.
Highlights:
Keywords: Judicial Review, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Supremacy, Comparative Law
[1] J. Asshiddiqie, Hukum Acara Pengujian Undang-Undang. Jakarta: Konstitusi Press, 2006.
[2] Kaisar et al., “Kewenangan Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Menguji Undang-Undang Perpajakan: Kajian Perbandingan dengan Negara Lain,” Jurnal Dialogica, vol. 1, no. 2, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://jurnal.fh.umi.ac.id/index.php/legal/article/view/2481
[3] H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945.
[4] E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies. New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2019.
[5] N. Huda, Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia. Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2014.
[6] M. Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971.
[7] P. M. Marzuki, Penelitian Hukum, edisi revisi. Jakarta: Kencana, 2021.
[8] P. M. Hadjon and T. S. Djatmiati, Argumentasi Hukum. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 2011.
[9] J. Ibrahim, Teori dan Metodologi Penelitian Hukum Normatif. Malang: Bayumedia, 2006.
[10] P. M. Marzuki, Penelitian Hukum. Jakarta: Kencana, 2017.
[11] H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945.
[12] J. Asshiddiqie, Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme Indonesia. Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2010.
[13] N. Huda, Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia. Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2014.
[14] S. Soekanto, Faktor-Faktor yang Mempengaruhi Penegakan Hukum. Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2008.
[15] H. A. Chalid, “Dualism of judicial review in Indonesia: Problems and solutions,” Indonesia Law Review, vol. 7, no. 3, Art. no. 5, 2017, doi: 10.15742/ilrev.v7n3.353.
[16] E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies. New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2019.
[17] E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies. New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2019.
[18] L. H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law. New York: Foundation Press, 2000.
[19] R. H. Fallon Jr., The Dynamic Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[20] E. Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction. New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2016.
[21] M. Tushnet, Why the Constitution Matters. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.
[22] J. S. Ritonga et al., “Perbandingan hukum administrasi antara Indonesia dan Amerika Serikat,” INNOVATIVE: Journal of Social Science Research, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 651–663, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://j-innovative.org/index.php/Innovative
[23] I. Maulana and Z. A. Hoesein, “Analisis komparatif kewenangan checks and balances legislatif Indonesia dan Amerika Serikat dalam perspektif konstitusi di kedua negara,” Al-Zayn: Jurnal Ilmu Sosial & Hukum, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 5345–5359, 2026, doi: 10.61104/alz.v4i1.4025.
[24] J. Asshiddiqie, Hukum Acara Pengujian Undang-Undang. Jakarta: Konstitusi Press, 2006.
[25] M. Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971.
[26] R. H. Fallon Jr., The Dynamic Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[27] E. Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction. New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2016.
[28] P. de Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World. London: Routledge, 1999.
[29] N. Huda, Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia. Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2014.
[30] N. Huda, Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia. Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2014.
[31] J. Asshiddiqie, Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme Indonesia. Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2010.
[32] S. Isra, Pergeseran Fungsi Legislasi. Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2018.
[33] M. F. Indrati, Ilmu Perundang-undangan. Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2007.
[34] L. M. Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975.
[35] W. Utami, “Perbandingan kewenangan badan legislatif di Indonesia dan Amerika Serikat (perspektif pembuatan undang-undang),” STAATSRECHT: Jurnal Hukum Kenegaraan dan Politik Islam, vol. 4, no. 1, Jun. 2024, doi: 10.14421/rawy8b84.